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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Twenty-five-year-old Daniel William Leary pleaded guilty to felony possession of 
a controlled substance. The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, 
with two-and-one-half years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. The district court 
subsequently suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Leary on probation for a period 
of five years. Mr. Leary later violated his probation, and the district court retained 
jurisdiction for a second time and then placed him back on probation. After Mr. Leary 
again violated his probation, the district court placed him back on probation, with the 
new fundamental condition that Mr. Leary apply for participation in drug court and 
successfully complete that program if accepted. The drug court later ordered that 
Mr. Leary be arrested on a drug court bench warrant. Mr. Leary served over two 
months jail time and was then released He was subsequently arrested on a second 
drug court bench warrant, and then on a probation violation bench warrant. The district 
court revoked probation and executed the sentence. However, the district court's 
calculation of credit for time served did not give Mr. Leary credit for the time served on 
the drug court bench warrants. 
Mr. Leary appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it calculated the 
credit for time served to which he was entitled. He asserted the 2015 amendments to 
Idaho Code §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 (hereinafter, the credit statutes) are retroactive and 
require the district court to give Mr. Leary credit for all the time served on the drug court 
bench warrants as a condition of his probation. 
1 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued Mr. Leary did not show the district 
calculation of time served was erroneous based on statutory amendments that 
were not effective when the district court made the calculation and that are not 
retroactive. (Resp. Br., pp.4-9.) This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's 
contention that the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes are not retroactive. The 
State's retroactivity argument is unavailing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Leary's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE 
district court err when it calculated the credit for time served which Mr. ry 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Calculated The Credit For Time Served To Which 
Mr. Leary Was Entitled 
Mr. Leary asserts that the district court erred when it calculated the credit for time 
served to which he was entitled. Mr. Leary requested "all credit for time served on any 
warrant that he served on-including that drug court warrant." (Tr., p.12, Ls.17-1 9.) 
The district court's award of credit for 526 days served did not include all the time 
Mr. Leary served on the drug court bench warrants as a condition of his probation. 1 As 
the State noted (Resp. Br., pp.6-7), the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes, 
I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603, were not in effect when the district court calculated the 
credit for time served. However, the amendments are retroactive and require the district 
court to give Mr. Leary credit for all the time served on the drug court bench warrants as 
a condition of probation. Thus, the district court erred when it calculated the credit for 
time served to which Mr. Leary was entitled. 
The State argues that the language of the amendments shows the Legislature 
intended the amendments to apply at the time a district court calculates time served 
1 The State's point that the additional 121 days awarded by the district court was based 
on the 121 days served between the November 18, 2014 motion for bench warrant for 
probation violation and the March 18, 2015 disposition is well-taken. (See Resp. 
Br., p.6 n.2.) Mr. Leary was in custody at the time the motion for bench warrant for 
probation violation was filed. (See R., p.187.) 
Conversely, the State's contention that Mr. Leary did not request credit for both 
drug court warrants is without support in the record. Mr. Leary specifically requested 
"all credit for time served on any warrant that he served on-including [the first] drug 
court warrant." (Tr., p.12, Ls.17-19.) Just because Mr. Leary highlighted the first drug 
court warrant does not negate the fact that he requested "all credit for time served on 
any warrant that he served on," i.e., the second drug court warrant as well. Thus, 
Mr. Leary would be entitled to the full nine days he served on the second drug 
court warrant. 
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upon imposing judgment. (Resp. Br., p.8.) According to the State, the only time credit 
is properly calculated is at the time the judgment is originally entered or ordered into 
execution: "the time the statute [I. C. § 18-309] applies is upon entry of judgment after 
the probation violation has been found .... Again, the contemplated time-frame for the 
awarding of credit for time served [under I.C. § 19-2603] is at the time the court revoked 
the probation." (Resp. Br., p.8.) The State's argument is unavailing. 
Contrary to the State's argument, the fact that the Idaho Criminal Rules 
specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion to correct the calculation of credit 
at any time shows that the time the judgment is entered or executed is not the critical 
factor in the credit calculation. See !.C.R. 35(c). Rather, as the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has recently made clear, "the language of I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory and requires that, 
in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as in this case) when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) 
motion for credit for time served, the court give the appropriate credit .... " State v. 
Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014). "This means that the defendant is entitled 
to credit for all time spent incarcerated," as defined by the statute.2 Id. Thus, the focus 
of the credit statutes is not on the judgment itself, but rather, on the person against 
whom that judgment was entered. See, e.g., id. If the person is incarcerated in relation 
to a judgment, the person is entitled to credit in that judgment. 
This conclusion is borne out by the very language of the credit statutes. For 
example, when a district court is granting credit for prejudgment incarceration, "[i]n 
computing the time of imprisonment when ... [the] sentence has been suspended and 
2 In Moore, the defendant was seeking credit for prejudgment incarceration. Moore, 156 
Idaho at 20-21. However, the reasoning of Moore applies equally to all periods of 
incarceration identified in the credit statutes. 
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later imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed shall 
credit in the judgment .... " LC. § 18-309(2) (emphasis added). Similarly, 
when the district court is reviewing a violation of the terms of probation, "[t]he defendant 
shall receive credit for time served ... for any time served as a condition of probation 
under the withheld judgment or suspended sentence." LC. § 19-2603 
(emphasis added). 
The State also incorrectly emphasizes the phrase: "When the court finds that the 
defendant has violated the terms of probation .... " (Resp. Br., p.8 (emphasis in 
original).) That particular provision of I.C § 19-2603 addresses when the district court 
is authorized to revoke probation: "When the court finds that the defendant has violated 
the terms and conditions of probation, it may ... revoke probation." I.C. § 19-2603. 
The provision about when the district court revokes probation does not impact on the 
credit calculation, since the credit calculation is addressed in a different part of the 
statute. As discussed above, that part of I C. § 19-2603 provides, "[t]he defendant shall 
receive credit ... for any time served as a condition of probation under the withheld 
judgment or suspended sentence." LC. § 19-2603. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849 (2012), 
further disproves the State's reading of the 2015 amendments. The relevant language 
in the sex offender registration statute amendment in Forbes provided: "A judgment of 
conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in 
section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be subject to dismissal or reduction under this 
section." Forbes, 152 Idaho at 851 (quoting Ch. 157, § 1, 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 473, 
473) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Forbes Court observed that, "[a]ccording 
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to the amendment, a conviction means that 'the person has pied guilty or has been 
found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment."' Id. The 
Court therefore held "the amendment clearly applies to [the defendant], who was 
subject to a withheld judgment after he pleaded guilty to an offense requiring sex 
offender registration." Id. The Forbes Court focused on the defendant as a person who 
had been convicted of an offense requiring sex offender registration, not on the time the 
withheld judgment was entered. See id. Similarly, the focus of the amendments here is 
on the person who is entitled to credit, not on the time the judgment is entered. 
The final point against the State's argument is that this Court, like the district 
court in Moore, is obligated to ensure the defendant is receiving "credit for the correct 
amount of time actually served . . . The [courts do] not have discretion to award credit 
for time served that is either more or less than that." See Moore, 156 Idaho at 21 (citing 
Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455, 456-57 (1983); State v. Rodriguez, 119 Idaho 895, 
897 (Ct. App. 1991 )) (emphasis added) Therefore, the State's argument-which is 
essentially that this Court should affirm an improper calculation of credit because of the 
time at which the judgment was entered or executed-is unavailing. 
Because the State's argument is unavailing, it is necessary to return to the plain 
language of the credit statutes to determine if the 2015 amendments have retroactive 
effect. See, e.g., Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937 (2014). As discussed in the 
Appellant's Brief, the amendments, by referring to past and future periods of 
incarceration served as a condition of release on probation (i.e., "any period of 
incarceration"), are retroactive by their plain language. (App. Br., pp.9-14.) 
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Because the Legislature made the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes 
retroactive in scope, they control in Mr. Leary's case. The district court erred when it 
calculated the credit for time served to which Mr. Leary was entitled, because it did not 
give him credit for all the time served on the drug court bench warrants as a condition 
of probation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons in the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Leary 
respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's calculation of credit for time 
served, vacate the district court's Order Revoking Probation and Imposing Sentence 
with respect to the calculation of credit for time served, and remand this case for entry 
of an order for all the credit to which Mr. Leary is entitled. 
DATED this 17th day of November, 2015. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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